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8 April 1966

WEST GERMANY'S DESTINY

By

JUN 29 1966

U. S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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West Germany's Destiny

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SUMMARY

The past ten years have been good to West Germany. Its economy has continued to expand, has been marked by steadily decreasing unemployment and steadily increasing incomes. The people are content with their democratic form of government and have experienced a period of remarkable internal stability. Their armed forces have been rebuilt and possess the capability of becoming the most powerful in Western Europe. All of these features have resulted in tremendous national power for the country. Fortunately for all, this power has been integrated into a series of alliances that preclude it from being misdirected in search of a few, shortsighted, independent goals.

In spite of this power and stability, the country is beset by conflicting pressures and problems. At home, West Germany must carefully watch its surging economy to ensure it does not suffer from overinflation. Its government has not yet been involved in a major crisis and has not proven that it can maintain its structure in face of such a challenge. The armed forces need more time to develop its professional stature and expand its reservoir of trained manpower. There are also pressures from outside sources who want to retain their dominant position in Western Europe and who do not intend to allow West Germany an authoritative role in world affairs.

The chances for German reunification still appear remote. They are blocked by the Soviet Union's opposition to any proposal except on terms which would do nothing to free East Germany from Communist influence. Neither is the free world ready to effect reunification by force. Although West Germany maintains its hopes for eventual reunification as a free country, there appears no peaceful, practical solution in sight.

West Germany is essential to the stability and defense of Western Europe. Conversely, the various multilateral alliances which include West Germany are essential to its future. The militant nationalism emerging in Eastern Europe offers a possible entree for West Germany to assist in their economic development and to improve its image among the satellite countries.

The soundest policy for West Germany to pursue at this time is to continue its alliances with the rest of Western Europe and the United States while increasing its efforts to gradually improve its economic and cultural relations with selected Eastern European countries. This will demand patience and perseverance for the West German leaders and people. It can be accomplished if they continue to display the mature, stable attitudes during the next ten years that have been shown during the past ten years.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago, the free world was anticipating the rebirth of a new sovereign Germany. The occupation of West Germany had ended and the country was being integrated into the Western European community. Organizations such as the West European Union (WEU), European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Economic Community (Common Market) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were starting to play an important role in the country's development. Conversely, West Germany was beginning to make significant contributions to each of them. The population and government had started to recover from the effects of World War II, but still bore the stigma of having caused it. This stigma was influencing the reaction of many countries towards the new Germany. Its economic potential and strategic position in Europe made it a sought-after addition to the Western European organizations. Yet, these same countries who wanted the benefits and protection available from West Germany were reluctant to see a prosperous, strong country developing that would soon be capable of competing again in the international arenas.

As the period opened, there were still hopes that a solution could be found to reunify East and West Germany. Negotiations were still taking place, but they became less productive with each meeting. As West Germany became more closely integrated with its neighbors in Western Europe, East Germany was being forcibly drawn

closer to its Communist neighbors as a valuable addition to the Soviet Bloc. The flood of refugees from the East provided evidence to the disquieting influence that this split was having throughout Germany.

During the years that followed, West Germany's impact on the affairs of Europe began to be felt. Other nations became increasingly interested in the country's internal activities as well as its foreign affairs. All were attempting to influence its transformation with a realization that it could not be held back any longer.

At home, there were conflicting requirements. The demands of economic growth, political development and military rearmament all had to be considered by the authorities. The population had to prove to themselves and to the world that they were capable of responding to these challenges in a manner that would permit them to be accepted by others. Many events were to occur during this decade that would test the country's stability. Leadership would change hands between two opposite personalities and test the democratic stability of the government. A powerful army would be formed that might again tempt the militaristic ambitions of a few. Foreign relations would vary between a peaceful "Treaty of Cooperation" with a competitor of long standing in Western Europe and continued opposition to the Soviet Union who is bent on retaining East Germany as its captive satellite.

How well has West Germany responded to these pressures? What is its present role in Western Europe? What does the future hold for the country? It is the purpose of this study to answer these

questions by examining the economic, military and political environment that has evolved during the past ten years, and to identify the internal and external pressures on the country in order to sort out the ones that are most affecting the country's future. The Berlin question has been excluded from this study in an effort to limit its scope. Selected courses of action are considered and recommendations made on the ones that hold the key to the country's destiny.

In addition to the references cited throughout this paper, the author has drawn upon his personal association with the Federal Republic of Germany's Army while a member of the staffs of the Seventh United States Army and the Central Army Group, NATO, from 1961 to 1965. Throughout this period, the author served in garrison and in the field with his German staff counterparts, and also had the opportunity to observe several German army units in field exercises.

CHAPTER 2

PROGRESS AND ENVIRONMENT

ECONOMIC

The economic recovery of West Germany, which had received much of its post-war impetus from the Marshall Plan support from the United States until 1955, continued when left on its own at the start of this period.¹ Much of the credit for this continued growth can be attributed to the astute guidance of Ludwig Erhard. Serving as the Minister of Economics during Adenauer's entire regime, Erhard initially concentrated his country's efforts on manufacturing capital goods and durable consumer goods for which there was a growing export market.² West Germany regained the Saarland from France during this period which provided a limited increase in coal and steel resources which were needed by these industries.³ Labor demands began to increase and were solved partially by refugees from the East. Although they caused an added drain on the limited food and housing resources in the country, they provided a valuable supply of labor for the industries as many of them were highly skilled. Before the interzonal border was fortified in 1961, over 13 million refugees had been absorbed in West Germany. Since then, over one million foreign workers from other European countries have

¹Fritz Erler, Democracy in Germany, p. 16.

²Norman J. G. Pounds, Divided Germany and Berlin, p. 107.

³Frank Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, p. 209.

entered West Germany and are a vital part of its labor pool.

Erhard's foresight and efforts paid dividends as the country is now the leading industrial nation in Western Europe.⁴

West Germany's agricultural system has not maintained the same pace as its industrial program. Consisting mostly of small, out-dated, family farms that have been handed down through the generations, the conversion to modern farming techniques has been slow. Although the country has reflected some increase in its agricultural self-sufficiency, it can presently feed only about 60 percent of its population.⁵ West Germany must continue to look to outside sources for additional food supplies and is fortunate to have a strong industrial base for trading purposes in return for the food.

Active participation in the Common Market has also had a favorable impact on the country's economy as reflected by a continuous increase in its industrial production.⁶ The Common Market does present some problems for West Germany's agriculture structure. Once tariffs are eliminated on farm products, the German farmers will not be able to compete with the lower prices of some other Common Market nations. The country will have to modernize its farm system further in order to increase its output or rely even more on

⁴Norman J. G. Pounds, Divided Germany and Berlin, passim.
US Dept of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports, Market Profiles: Western Europe and Canada, p. 8 (referred to hereafter as "Commerce, Profiles").

⁵Norman J. G. Pounds, The Economic Pattern of Modern Germany, passim.

⁶Federal Republic of Germany Statistical Office, Handbook of Statistics for the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 78.

foreign food imports. The Common Market programs are principally long range and it will require a few more years before they can be thoroughly evaluated.

The division of Germany has not hindered the economic progress of West Germany. Although limited in some raw materials that were previously obtained from the East German sector, it has been possible to obtain them from other sources in Western Europe. In fact, the economic recovery has benefited from the country's division. Without it, the refugee labor source would not have been available and post-war economic assistance would have been spread over a wider area. It is also doubtful that the Common Market would have been formed as other member countries might not have desired to establish such ties with a Germany having the size and resources to dominate the other nations in the community.

The country's foreign trade expanded almost as fast as its industrial production. Its exports in recent years have exceeded its imports resulting in a favorable balance of payments posture.⁷ Although West Germany benefits a great deal from its Common Market trading, it is noteworthy that it conducts more foreign trade outside of it.⁸ This emphasizes the scope of the country's trade activities today and the extent of its development in recent years. The pattern of foreign trade reflects that of any highly

⁷Commerce, Profiles, p. 8.

⁸US Dept of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports, Basic Data on the Economy of the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 18 (referred to hereafter as "Commerce, Basic Data").

industrialized nation. Imports consist mainly of foodstuffs and industrial raw materials to include over two thirds of the required petroleum for the country. Exports are dominated by manufactured goods and products of the engineering and other related industries.⁹ The popular Volkswagen seen throughout the world is frequent evidence of its export activities. Today, West Germany ranks third among world trading countries after the United States and the United Kingdom.¹⁰

Trade with the satellite countries of Eastern Europe has been limited; nevertheless, here exists an excellent opportunity to increase relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe, and to ease tensions between the two areas. This will be discussed in greater detail later on in this paper. The volume of interzonal trade between East and West Germany is insignificant, but serves as a valuable political tool for helping to keep the access routes open to East Berlin and East Germany.¹¹

The period of economic reconstruction has about ended in West Germany. The country has established itself as a world power in trade and industry. The population is continuing to improve its standards of living every year and there are no large, dissatisfied elements within the society. The economic challenge now facing the

⁹Norman J. G. Pounds, The Economic Pattern of Modern Germany, pp. 108-113, passim.

¹⁰Commerce, Basic Data, p. 17.

¹¹Karl Schiller, "Germany's Economic Requirements," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, Jul. 1965, p. 672.

country is how successfully the leaders can continue to manage this progress and maintain the economic growth without severe inflation. With this expanding industry, labor is becoming more in short supply, and both wages and consumer prices are increasing. In 1965, imports exceeded the country's exports creating an imbalance of payments condition.¹² Chancellor Erhard has always encouraged a free market economy with the fewest possible government controls.¹³ Although this policy has been successful in the past, this recent trend may force the administration to increase these controls possibly by curbing wages and reducing public spending. Such moves would be unpopular for the administration as they could arrest the economic development and lessen Erhard's popularity.

POLITICAL

Until 1963, West Germany's political activities were guided by the firm hand of Konrad Adenauer. Serving as the first Chancellor of post-war Germany starting in 1949, he is principally responsible for the successful introduction of the democratic form of government found within the country today, as well as the important role the country is playing in Western Europe and other international circles. Adenauer worked hard to establish an early reconciliation with France while at the same time, build up close relationships with the United States.¹⁴

¹²"Is the German 'Miracle' Dimming?", Business Week, No. 1894, 18 Dec. 1965, p. 64.

¹³Ibid., p. 62.

¹⁴Klaus Epstein, Germany After Adenauer, p. 4.

West Germany maintained close ties with the United States during most of Adenauer's reign. Some of this international favoritism can be attributed to the early economic assistance provided by the United States, and because of the need for the protection that the United States military forces in West Germany provided Central Europe against a continuing threat of communism from the Soviet Union. Adenauer considered his relations with the United States strongest during the period 1953-1959 when John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State. Dulles went to great effort to keep Adenauer informed of the United States' policies in Europe; particularly with respect to the Soviet Union. Following Dulles' death, Adenauer became concerned that he was not being kept fully informed on United States' policies, and feared that they were about to undertake peacemaking measures with the Soviet Union at the possible expense of German reunification.¹⁵ As a result, during Adenauer's later years in office, he turned to stronger pro-French attitudes; a situation that was quickly accepted by President de Gaulle and resulted in the French-German Treaty of Cooperation established in 1963.¹⁶

Adenauer's political control within West Germany began to deteriorate during his last years in office. Faced with a new generation of voters, Adenauer, then in his mid-eighties, started to make some political blunders and to lose his public appeal. One

¹⁵Don Cook, Floodtide in Europe, p. 134.

¹⁶French Embassy, French-German Cooperation, p. 1.

of these blunders pertained to a freedom of the press issue which was cherished in this new democracy. Members of the staff of a popular weekly magazine, Der Speigel, had become critical of military policies. In late 1962, they published an article criticizing the country's military posture which suggested some possible security leaks. The key members of the magazine staff were arrested and vigorously prosecuted in a manner that smacked of tyranny. This caused such a public uproar that Adenauer replaced his Minister of Defense who had ordered the arrest of the magazine staff, and agreed to step down from his office the following year.¹⁷

Little had been done to prepare or identify a successor for Adenauer. He refused to recognize the time when he would have to be replaced. In 1954, Adenauer was quoted as saying, "My God, what will happen to Germany when I am not there."¹⁸

The ultimate successor to Adenauer received very little support from him even though they were both members of the same political party. Ludwig Erhard was considered by Adenauer to be expert in economics but weak in foreign affairs, and lacking the aggressiveness of a true politician.¹⁹ Erhard had great public appeal, however. As the Minister of Economics since 1949, he represented to most the individual truly responsible for their personal prosperity. When Adenauer finally retired in 1963, halfway through his fourth

¹⁷ Jeanne Kuebler, West German Election, 1965, p. 607.

¹⁸ Robert Spencer, "Germany in the 'Erhard Era', " International Journal, Vol. 19, Autumn 1964, p. 458.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 459.

term, Erhard was elected by the Bundestag to serve out the remaining two year term as the second Chancellor of post-war Germany.

Erhard quickly demonstrated his ability to pursue an active foreign policy program. He took prompt steps to restrengthen relations with the United States which had become strained during Adenauer's later years in office. There was no doubt that he favored understanding with the United States more than a rapprochement with France.²⁰ He actively supported his country's effort to participate in NATO affairs, and favored Great Britain's increased participation in European activities.²¹ The success of his administration was reflected in the general elections of 1965 when he was reelected for a full four year term. Actually, the election campaign produced no major issues between the two major political parties. Both favored continued strong association with NATO and the United States.²² The voting public had demonstrated satisfaction with the political arrangement in their country and did not want to make major changes that would alter their present status.

Some internal political problems face Erhard for he does not have the same domination over the Bundestag that Adenauer experienced. Erhard is still opposed publicly by Adenauer who has retained his position as Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union Party, and frequently speaks out against Erhard's political activities. Now

²⁰Willis, op. cit., p. 316.

²¹Spencer, op. cit., p. 463.

²²Thomas J. Hamilton, "German Election in Home Stretch," New York Times, 12 Sep. 1965, p. E3.

ninety years old, Adenauer's influence will continue to wane. Also in strong opposition to Erhard is Franz-Josef Strauss, the former Minister of Defense who was dismissed in 1962 for his participation in the "Der Speigel affair". Strauss is still active in politics in southern Germany and desires to regain power within the government. A dynamic, impulsive person, he favors closer ties with France and objects to any softening of relations with Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union.²³ Offended that Erhard did not call him back into his new cabinet, Strauss would like to overthrow Erhard and succeed him as Chancellor.²⁴ Although his popularity has dimmed in comparison to Erhard's in recent years, he can be counted on to challenge Erhard whenever possible. Strauss is considered a political liability to the CDU/CSU parties and might be more of a threat if he attempted to form his own radical, nationalist following prior to the 1969 elections.

West Germany's internal political atmosphere is reasonably stable today. One important factor toward this stability is the provision in the Federal Republic Constitution which allows only those political parties which receive more than five percent of the total votes cast in an election to be represented in the Bundestag.²⁵ This precaution prevents a large number of splinter parties from being installed in the Bundestag and paralyzing its parliamentary

²³ Jeanne Kuebler, West German Election, 1965, p. 607.

²⁴ "West Germany: March of Oblivion," Newsweek, Vol. 67, 29 Nov. 1965, p. 40.

²⁵ Fritz Erler, Democracy in Germany, p. 7.

activities as happened in the days of the Weimar Republic prior to World War II.

Although most of the public participates in the elections as evidenced by an 87 percent turnout in the 1965 elections, they are not eager to serve in public office.²⁶ Herein lies a possible danger once the present generation in office passes on. Most of the present officials have been associated with the federal or state governments since the post-war reorganization. What personalities will develop from the younger generation is not evident at this time. Likewise, how strong their feelings will be on policy matters remains to be seen. A study in 1964 by the United States' Consulate on what political matters most concern the German youths (30 years old and below) revealed that they considered reunification to be of most interest to them.²⁷ How these new voters manifest this interest will be an important consideration in the 1969 elections.

The democratic transition of the German government to Erhard has been smooth, but he faces a challenging future. He must continue to maintain the progressive economy at home which was described earlier. The foreign affairs and national defense programs that will provide major tests for his administration will be discussed in Chapter III.

²⁶"Germany: Heavy Winner," Newsweek, Vol. 67, 4 Oct. 1965, p. 46.

²⁷Cook, op. cit., p. 332.

MILITARY

The rebirth of West Germany's armed forces during this period is not as spectacular as its economic recovery. The first indication of any ambition for a post-war military force was expressed by Chancellor Adenauer shortly after his election in 1949 when he indicated a desire to participate in the NATO Alliance as soon as possible.²⁸ There was much internal and external opposition to the idea of German rearmament. The German people were concerned with the possibility of a revival of the military rule that they had experienced during Hitler's regime. Outside, no other country wanted to permit a rearmed West Germany so soon after World War II.

Other events were taking place that reinforced Adenauer's desires and indicated a need for increased defenses in Central Europe. The Soviet Union had shown that it had little interest in a peaceful Europe or a reunified Germany. There was a growing fear of Soviet aggression and increasing concern over Soviet policies toward the countries in Eastern Europe. During this same period, the Korean War started and the German interzonal border offered the possibility of becoming another 38th Parallel. A proposal was made to allow West Germany to rearm and provide division-size forces to NATO in an effort to bolster the European defenses.²⁹ Distasteful as the idea was, an armed West Germany serving as a buffer to

²⁸Ibid., p. 111.

²⁹Richard Mayne, The Community of Europe, Past, Present, and Future, p. 101.

possible Soviet aggression was now needed to help protect Western Europe.

France was still reluctant to permit West Germany to form any military units as large as a division. Instead, they proposed that a European Defense Community (EDC) be formed into which all the countries would contribute brigade-size forces which would be merged into a multinational European Army.³⁰ Acceptance of this concept would require all participants to surrender sovereign control of the forces it contributed to the EDC. After extended debate on the subject, the French National Assembly vetoed the idea and efforts to establish it were abandoned in 1954.³¹

When the chances of West Germany being permitted to rebuild its armed forces appeared bleakest, the Western European nations agreed to amend the Brussels Treaty Organization and allow West Germany to join. This also incorporated the country into NATO which had been Adenauer's goal for so long.³² West Germany's contribution to the Alliance was limited to twelve divisions, and it was prohibited from manufacturing atomic, bacteriological, chemical, or other large scale weapons.³³

³⁰Ralph Flenley, Modern German History, p. 426.

³¹Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 163.

³²US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany 1944-1961, "Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty," p. 155, and "Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, October 23, 1954," p. 173 (referred to hereafter as "Congress, German Documents").

³³Mayne, op. cit., pp. 105, 162-167, passim.

In spite of this authority to rearm, the German government faced much opposition to the idea at home.³⁴ It was necessary for the administration to sell the new military program to the people. Firm steps were taken to organize a military structure under tight civilian governmental control. A civilian Minister of Defense was designated who also served as the peacetime Commander in Chief.³⁵ Next, a "watch dog" committee was established in the Bundestag and given the power of investigation similar to that found in our own Senate committees. The Bundestag also elected a Commissioner of the Armed Forces who serves as a civilian Inspector General and is charged with protecting the civil rights and human dignity of the serviceman.³⁶

The administration had the difficult task of obtaining top military leaders whose past performances would not jeopardize the image of the new armed forces. All officers selected for the rank of Colonel or above were carefully screened by a civilian committee established by the Bundestag.³⁷ No doubt, this system barred many capable, former senior officers from rejoining the army. However, it also prevented any rebirth of the militarism of the Third Reich era and helped to ease the fears of the people. The country established

³⁴ Gordon A. Craig, NATO and the New German Army, p. 4.

³⁵ Press and Information Office at the Federal German Government, The Federal German Armed Forces, p. 12 (referred to hereafter as "German Armed Forces").

³⁶ Fritz Erler, Democracy in Germany, pp. 75-77, passim.

³⁷ Kurt Becker, "The Federal Defense Forces (Bundeswehr)," in Meet Germany, p. 46.

general conscription in 1957 making all men between 18 and 45 years of age subject to 12 months of military service in some branch of the armed forces.³⁸ This term of service was extended to 18 months in 1961 at the time the Berlin Wall was built.³⁹

As the armed forces grew, they were gradually accepted throughout the country and today they truly represent those of any democracy. The officers and other ranks are well motivated toward their mission as part of the NATO forces. The precautions, legislation and civilian control systems appear to have prevented any resurgence of national militarism. It may seem to some that the system of controls over the German Army today provide too many safeguards which interfere with its military efficiency. My personal observations and discussions with German Army personnel during the past four years indicate this is not a fair criticism. Although there are many problems, they relate more to a lack of junior officers and experienced noncommissioned officers. Individual spirit is high and discipline is effective. This is easy to understand in view of the country's location close to the Soviet Block countries. One needs only to patrol the divided zone of Germany to sense a need for a strong military force there. This feeling has been effectively transmitted throughout the army. Units are well motivated and fully understand their mission as a part of NATO.

³⁸German Armed Forces, p. 10.

³⁹Wallace J. Magathan, Jr., "West German Defense Policy," Orbis, Vol. 3, Summer 1964, p. 297.

Today, the German armed forces are the largest contribution to NATO from any of the European countries, and are second only to the United States in forces committed for the defense of Central Europe.⁴⁰ They represent a successful effort by the German government to raise a strong, democratic force. Having now gained public acceptance, they are playing a vital role for the country and for the free world.

⁴⁰The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1965-1966, pp. 15-25, passim.

CHAPTER 3

PRESSURES AND PROBLEMS

WEST GERMANY AND NATO

Until relations between Western Europe and Russia improve and a decision is reached on reunification that is acceptable to all concerned, West Germany will continue to have a vital role in the defense of Western Europe. Forces in Germany must be ready and able to counter any aggression from the East and to defend the frontiers of NATO. Prohibited from having its own independent forces, West Germany was able to assure its protection only by early integration into NATO. The details of the initial stages of its rearmament have been discussed earlier. Suffice to say here that the country's rearmament efforts have resulted in an armed forces of over 430,000 and now includes an Army of 12 divisions, 32 Air Force squadrons, and a 35,000 man Navy.¹

The wartime employment of these forces is determined by the commanders and staffs within the NATO chain of command. Although several German officers are in positions of authority in these headquarters, their influence is balanced by the presence of members from the other NATO countries. Parochial efforts are averted by this system, and West Germany has completely accepted its role as part of the integrated structure. The country has not made any

¹The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1965-1966, p. 18.

effort to limit the employment of its forces solely for national use. Neither has it withdrawn any of its forces from NATO as France has done in recent years.² This might occur if a strong nationalistic surge developed in the country which ran counter to NATO policies and would be a serious threat to NATO.

National authorities have always supported the concept of a strong nuclear deterrent for NATO.³ They desire that the enemy be stopped close to the Iron Curtain in order to secure as much of West Germany as possible. Mostly at the request of West Germany a few years ago, NATO's main defense line was moved from the Rhine River forward to the Iron Curtain.⁴ The shift from a massive nuclear retaliatory strategy to the flexible response concept caused a similar change in West Germany's defense policies. Because the United States had proposed the flexible response concept, West Germany supported it. However, West German officials take every opportunity to stress the continued need for nuclear weapons during the early stages of any battle.⁵

Like all other nations in Western Europe, one of the major concerns of West Germany today is its lack of any voice in planning for the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear strategy in Europe has been

²Drew Middleton, "French Navy Ends NATO Alliance Ties," New York Times, 22 Jun. 1963, p. 1.

³Wallace C. Magathan, Jr., "West German Defense Policy," Orbis, Vol. 3, Summer 1964, p. 295.

⁴Hans Speidel, "The Defense of Europe," Military Review, Vol. 65, May 1965, p. 29.

⁵Kai-Uwe Von Hassel, "Organizing Western Defense," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, Jan. 1965, p. 211.

directed by the United States who controls 95 percent of the NATO nuclear striking power.⁶ It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the entire question of nuclear control in NATO which could be the subject of a separate thesis. Of interest here only is the impact of this question of West Germany who wants to participate as an equal member in some form of a multinational system for nuclear policymaking.⁷ Its leaders have become increasingly sensitive to this point in light of its large contribution to NATO, and because it is the only European nation to have met its total commitment. They are also concerned that nuclear participation by West Germany might be withheld by the United States in return for a nonproliferation agreement with the Soviet Union.

All proposals to revise the present system for preparing NATO's nuclear strategy have been unsuccessful. The other major European nations have vetoed the proposed multilateral force (MLF) on the grounds that it is too costly and offers no major improvement over the present veto authority of the United States.⁸ Although discussion continues on this subject, no solution has yet been offered that is attractive to all nations involved. The latest meeting in December, 1965 between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard indicated only that the matter would be given further study.⁹ The

⁶ Fredrick W. Mulley, "NATO's Nuclear Problems: Control or Consultation," Orbis, Spring 1964, Vol. 8, p. 21.

⁷ Ibid., p. 23.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Thomas J. Hamilton, "Erhard Got Promises But Little More," New York Times, 26 Dec. 1965, p. E5.

results of West Germany's nuclear search could have a strong impact on NATO's stability. Among the options the country might take are: (1) abandon the Brussels Treaty and manufacture its own weapons, (2) seek nuclear weapons from other sources, (3) continue efforts toward a multinational force in NATO.

Either of the first two options would destroy the NATO Alliance and result in a loss of Western friendship that West Germany has been developing since gaining its sovereignty. No country in the free world has indicated any willingness to furnish West Germany with nuclear weapons. The only possible source might be Communist China in an effort to protect itself against the Soviet Union. This would require a complete reversal of West Germany's policies and is highly unlikely without some other unforeseen turn in world affairs.

The third option requires perseverance and patience by the West German authorities. Gradually, the country has regained its position in the world and has aligned itself thoroughly with the West. Even though it has not achieved reunification which is its greatest objective, its recovery from World War II has been made possible only by these ties with the West. A multinational nuclear system may be developed through the gradual evolution of a common policy between the United States and the Western European nations. It cannot occur until there is greater evidence of mutual trust within Western Europe. This will come about only after the fear of a strong Germany has lessened. It will require a continued stable environment within West Germany to establish such confidence

and probably cannot occur in this generation while the memories of the past are still alive. Neither Great Britain nor France are ready to accept any proposal for a multilateral nuclear force or a combined nuclear planning group that would allow West Germany to assume any significant role. In spite of little hope for any solution in the near future, this option is the soundest for the country to follow.

West Germany's geographical location and force contribution to NATO have made it a key member of the Alliance. The mutual benefits derived by that country and the other countries of Western Europe signify how thoroughly it has integrated itself into the free world community. Now, it must remain part of that community even though it may become distressed with its minor role in the nuclear arena. This will have to be resolved with time; not by an ill-conceived, shortsighted effort that would destroy its present status.

GERMAN-FRENCH RELATIONS

In spite of the bitter memories of World War II, the barriers between Germany and France were bridged by political, military and economic activities during this period. Relations between these two countries have a strong effect on West Germany's position in the free world today. Some of the principal actions reflecting these relations, and some indications of where these countries stand today with respect to each other, follow.

When West Germany obtained its sovereignty in 1954, the two countries were then able to negotiate on an equal basis. The European Coal and Steel Community provided an early step toward reconciliation and incorporated the coal and steel industries of both countries into a common pool with four other countries of Western Europe.¹⁰ The Common Market also served to tie these two countries closer together and provided a means for increased trade relations.¹¹

The status of the Saarland with its valuable coal and iron resources was a sensitive issue between the two countries during this period. In 1955, the Saarlanders voted to unite with West Germany as opposed to remaining under French control or being placed under the monitorship of the Western European Union.¹² It was subsequently agreed between France and Germany in 1956 that they would be allowed to rejoin West Germany in return for extensive economic concessions to France and continued access to the coal fields in that area until 1980.¹³

When de Gaulle became President in 1958, Adenauer was not certain whether the close relations would continue as he felt they would be overshadowed by de Gaulle's strong nationalistic desires.¹⁴ Although de Gaulle assured Adenauer that he planned to continue the

¹⁰German Information Center, Germany in Europe, p. 8.

¹¹Frank Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, p. 235.

¹²Ibid., p. 209.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 275.

association, it soon became apparent that he intended for France to be the dominant power. He advocated an integrated Europe, and felt that this should be accomplished at the expense of softening West Germany's relations with the United States. De Gaulle has often stressed this point in connection with his concept of a united Europe combined with the Soviet Union from the Atlantic to the Urals.¹⁵

De Gaulle continued to court Adenauer's favor through a series of impressive state visits. In January, 1963, a "Treaty of Cooperation" was proposed between the two countries aimed to increase military, political, and economic cooperation as well as educational and cultural contacts. The treaty provided for:

1. Semi-annual meeting between the heads of state.
2. Foreign Minister meeting at least every three months.
3. Regular meeting between responsible officials in the fields of defense, education, and youth.
4. Consultation on all important matters of foreign policy prior to any decision in order to develop a common position.¹⁶

Relations between the two countries appeared to be approaching new highs as a result of this treaty, and Adenauer's desire for a rapprochement were being attained. However, many in the German government were concerned that this treaty would dilute its participation in NATO and other European commitments. At their

¹⁵French Embassy, General de Gaulle Outlines the Principles of France's Foreign Policy Following the Failure of the Summit Conference, p. 4.

¹⁶French Embassy, French-German Cooperation, pp. 2-3.

insistence, a preamble was added which cautioned that the treaty was not to be placed above the alliances between Europe and the United States.¹⁷ Erhard has continued to reaffirm his country's preference for a strong Atlantic Alliance as the official government policy.¹⁸ As pointed out earlier, there remains in West Germany a minority led by the Adenauer-Strauss combine who prefer that priority be given to closer French-German relations.

De Gaulle's efforts to extend French grandeur in Europe were thwarted by Erhard's refusal to lessen the ties with the United States. Since then, the French government has been taking steps to improve its relations with the Soviet Union. The intent of these diplomatic maneuverings is quite clear. De Gaulle has in mind to weaken the Atlantic Alliance by threatening West Germany with a possible French-Russian agreement on West Germany's future. In a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the two agreed that West Germany's present boundaries should not be altered.¹⁹ Such an agreement seems to indicate that France is withdrawing its support of the June, 1964 joint declaration by the Western powers that all of Germany should have the right to exercise its own self-determination.²⁰ By this means, de Gaulle hopes to pressure the

¹⁷"French-German Treaty Approved by Bundestag," Washington Post, 17 May 1963, p. A17.

¹⁸"LBJ, Erhard Reaffirm Alliance After Talk Here," Washington Post, 5 Jun. 1965, p. A8.

¹⁹"New Storm Over Germany - de Gaulle's Latest Maneuver," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 59, 8 Nov. 1965, p. 65.

²⁰Gerhard Schroeder, "Germany Looks at Eastern Europe," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, Oct. 1965, p. 20 (referred to hereafter as "Schroeder, Eastern Europe").

German authorities into accepting a French dominated Europe in return for France's support of German reunification. On another occasion, de Gaulle has indicated that he believed discussion on Germany's future should be a subject for consideration by only European nations.²¹ It is unlikely that Erhard would ever agree to this concept, for it would leave West Germany's future in the hands of the countries whose singular purpose is to prevent its emergence as the dominant power in Europe.

West Germany's future and the stability of Europe will depend a lot on the manner in which it reacts to these pressures. It is difficult to visualize a situation where the country would be forced to make an outright choice between severing ties with the United States and accepting French control of Europe. International politics are not that clear cut. Erhard must accommodate both countries to a degree so that he can maintain hope for reunification of the country as well as the desire for a major role in world affairs.

In spite of these differences, relations between the two countries have improved in recent years. The meeting between various agencies that were directed by the 1963 treaty are being held. Much has been accomplished in the educational and cultural areas. Religious leaders' and teachers' conferences, student meetings, and other youth exchanges are frequent, and involve hundreds of people

²¹Drew Middleton, "Challenge to U.S.," New York Times, 2 Jun. 1965, p. 1.

from both countries.²² Such contacts can help toward easing the tensions that have existed for so long, and create a favorable influence on the younger generations involved. The foreign policy issues that are the greatest cause of the cleavage have lingered for many years. Perhaps they will not be solved in this generation. If not, maybe those who have had the advantages of this early association under more friendly circumstances can solve the problems when given the opportunity.

EASTERN EUROPE

The Soviet conquest of the Eastern European countries provided early indication that they would block any relations between West Germany and the satellite countries. The relationship between the two zones of Germany are discussed in the next portion of this chapter. It is the intention here to consider the relationship between West Germany and the rest of the Soviet Bloc countries in an effort to determine the impact on West Germany's future.

Until recently, there has been little official contact between these two areas. Closely controlled by the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries were drawn tightly into the Communist sphere. These countries became a vital part of the Soviet economy, and were forced into a system of centralized economic control which prevented them from fulfilling their own needs.²³ Any effort toward

²²Willis, op. cit., p. 321.

²³"Winds of Change in Eastern Europe" - Part I, For Commanders, Vol. 4, 1 Feb. 1965, p. 1 (referred to hereafter as "Commanders, Eastern Europe").

independent action was quickly blocked. The suppression of the 1956 uprising in Hungary reflected the extent of Soviet control in Eastern Europe. There was little possibility for any contact with West Germany even if desired. The Soviet Union used the threat of a rearmed West Germany to perpetuate the image of old Germany, and to impress on these countries that much of their efforts were to protect Eastern Europe from the revanchism of West Germany.²⁴

West Germany's policy toward these countries is reflected by the Hallstein Doctrine established in 1955. Designed to isolate East Germany, it prohibits West Germany from establishing diplomatic relations with any country who recognizes the East German government.²⁵ This policy was a product of the Dulles-Adenauer "NATO hard line concept" of the mid-fifties. They hoped that the threat of a strong NATO would weaken the Soviet Union's hold on the Eastern European countries. If this happened, the NATO Alliance might be extended to include these countries.²⁶ The Soviet Union countered the NATO threat by organizing the military forces of the Eastern Bloc countries under the Warsaw Pact, and NATO did not expand into Eastern Europe.²⁷ Since then, the Hallstein Doctrine has been working to West Germany's disadvantage. Events are taking place that would make it beneficial now to have diplomatic relations with many of the countries.

²⁴Schroeder, Eastern Europe, p. 17.

²⁵Don Cook, Floodtide in Europe, p. 334.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 334-335.

²⁷Richard F. Staar, "The East European Alliance System," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 90, Sep. 1964, p. 28.

Cracks are starting to show in the Soviet Bloc. Many of the countries are beginning to reveal signs of a gradual shift toward increased nationalism and breaking away from tight Soviet control. They have indicated dissatisfaction with the centralized economic system, and are attempting to improve their own standards by increasing trade with the free world.²⁸ These signs of nationalistic self-assertion provide an excellent entree for West Germany. It can assist their economic development, and improve its own image in Eastern Europe. By discreetly encouraging this spirit, the Soviet influence can be sabotaged. This opportunity is happening at a particularly critical time for the Soviet Union who is burdened by its ideological dispute with Communist China.

The West German authorities recognized the opportunity for expanding their interest into Eastern Europe a few years ago. The Bundestag passed a resolution in 1961 pointing up the need for normalizing relations between the two areas.²⁹ Progress has been partially hampered by the rigid Hallstein Doctrine, and by the need to overcome years of ill feeling and suspicion that have remained since World War II. The country has already taken some steps to circumvent the Hallstein Doctrine by establishing trade missions in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.³⁰ The response has been favorable as trade between these countries and West Germany already

²⁸Commanders, Eastern Europe, p. 4.

²⁹Schroeder, Eastern Europe, p. 16.

³⁰Ibid., p. 18.

exceeds one billion dollars annually.³¹ While this amounted to only four percent of West Germany's total foreign trade in 1964, incomplete statistics available for 1965 indicate that it is continuing to increase.³² Attempts are also underway to establish similar contacts with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but have been unsuccessful.³³

West Germany can benefit in several ways by increasing its association with these countries. Economically, the new markets will increase its own foreign trade program. More significant are the political gains which could lead toward lessening the East-West dichotomy. If West Germany is able to convince these other countries that the gestures are in the interest of peace, it will help to destroy its revanchist image. It is not suggested that West Germany can dissolve the Soviet Bloc by its economic association with these countries. However, this could be a means of weakening the Bloc by lessening the economic interdependence that the Soviet Union has created. Once this has been accomplished, steps should be taken to promote multilateral political ties between West Germany and susceptible countries. Possible treaties of cooperation, similar to that developed with France, may evolve and further ease the East-West tensions.

³¹Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Surveys by the OECD: Germany, p. 39.

³²Ibid.

³³Schroeder, Eastern Europe, p. 22.

The time has come for West Germany to free itself of the self-imposed restrictions caused by the Hallstein Doctrine. It has become a burden and exposes West Germany to a form of political and economic blackmail from some of the African-Asian countries. These countries are using the threat of recognizing East Germany as a means of obtaining large quantities of foreign aid.³⁴ Other countries evade the Hallstein Doctrine by establishing only trade missions with East Germany and thus retain their diplomatic status with West Germany.³⁵ One step in this direction would be to eliminate from its provisions all the countries of Eastern Europe under the guise that they were forced to recognize East Germany by the Soviet Union. This would allow West Germany to deal more freely with these countries as independent nations. Once economic programs are established, cultural and even political exchanges could follow. Any improvements in relations which expose these countries more to the western world would help to erode the Soviet Bloc and be a major step toward establishing a peaceful, united Europe.

REUNIFICATION

The question of reunification has been a festering, unresolved problem since the Federal Republic was formed. The history of the division of Germany following World War II is well known. The separation of the country along such unnatural lines into its two

³⁴"Germany: The Passing of a Policy," Newsweek, Vol. 65, 8 Mar. 1965, p. 65.

³⁵Ibid.

sectors continues to represent the true conflict between the opposite ideologies of the free western world and the Communist empire.

Throughout the past ten years, there have been frequent proposals and counter proposals concerning possible reunification of Germany. None of them has reflected any serious intention of either side being willing to make major sacrifices in the basic divergent policies separating the two worlds. Essentially, these policies are:

1. A determination by West Germany and the other western powers to seek German unity through peaceful means based on self-determination of all of Germany (including Berlin) in free elections. This newly established government would then conclude a peace treaty for the entire country.³⁶

2. Insistence by the Soviet Union that a confederation be established between the Federal Republic of Germany and The German Democratic Republic. Future negotiations concerning the peace treaty for Germany would be conducted within the framework of the confederation. In addition, the Soviets propose that West Berlin become a demilitarized, free, international city.³⁷

There have been several proposals toward reunification that have been rejected by the Soviet Union. Shortly after West Germany joined NATO, the western powers proposed in 1955 that free elections be held throughout all of Germany the following year to determine an

³⁶Karl Lowenstein, "Unity for Germany?", Current History, Vol. 38, Jan. 1960, p. 39.

³⁷Ibid.

all-Germany government.³⁸ Again in 1959, the Foreign Ministers of the same countries recommended that general elections be held following a two and one half year preparatory period. During this time, a mixed committee consisting of 25 members from West Germany and 10 members from East Germany would be formed and prepare the electoral laws.³⁹ The most recent effort was made in 1962 when the same countries offered to amend the 1959 proposal to allow for equal East and West German representation on the committee.⁴⁰

Although the proposals described above reflect a common understanding among the western powers on this question, there is some feeling that the free world may not truly desire a reunified Germany. This is particularly so among the British and French who would experience severe economic and other international competition from a Germany of over 70 million people.⁴¹ After a few years that would be required to accomplish the internal reorganization of East Germany, the combined economic resources of both sectors would overwhelm the rest of Western Europe. It is easily understood why these countries openly support peaceful reunification when all indications point against it occurring in the near future. These same countries have

³⁸US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany 1944-1961, "Western Proposal for Reunification of Germany by Free Elections, November 4, 1955," p. 208.

³⁹US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany 1944-1961, "Western Peace Plan, Presented at Geneva by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, May 14, 1959," pp. 462-463.

⁴⁰Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 213.

⁴¹M. K. Dziewanowski, "West Germany and East Europe," Current History, Vol. 44, Apr. 1963, p. 209.

no intention of taking any forceful action to help accomplish reunification when they would be so affected.

Reunification has continued to remain a principal aim of the West German government. It has been an announced political goal in all elections as every German politician realizes that it would be self-defeating to abandon the idea. Chancellor Erhard again emphasized this point in his first message to the Bundestag following his 1965 reelection.⁴² The German people expect to hear this declaration from their leaders, but they are not willing to take chances or make personal sacrifices to attain it.⁴³ As time passes, they appear to realize that chances for reunification are remote. A recent poll in West Germany indicated that while over 50 percent of the public considers reunification to be the country's most pressing problem, only one third of them believe it possible within the next 20 years.⁴⁴

Reunification would also impose some economic strain on West Germany. East Germany is not a self-sufficient nation, and has a standard of living much lower than found in West Germany. If the two sectors are joined, it will result in a temporary loss of Germany's position in the world markets as considerable of its resources will have to be allocated to the East German recovery program. As previously mentioned, there is already a labor shortage

⁴²Konrad Erhard, "Reunification of Germany Means Peace in Europe; Moscow Makes An Error," The Bulletin, Vol. 13, 16 Nov. 1965, p. 2.

⁴³Lowenstein, op. cit., p. 41.

⁴⁴Anatole Shub, "Agitation Sends German Reunification Fever Up in West Zone," Washington Post, 11 Aug. 1965, p. A24.

in West Germany and many skilled workers would be needed in East Germany. It is unlikely that those who fled East Germany would desire to return there after having become well established in West Germany.

The Soviet Union's intention to prevent reunification has been demonstrated many times during past years, and there are no indications that they will permit divided Germany to reunite as a free country. Although they have made some gestures toward reunification, the proposals have always contained provisions that were completely unacceptable to West Germany and the free world. In 1952 and 1955, the Soviets proposed reunification on the basis of neutralization of all of Germany. These proposals were rejected by Chancellor Adenauer who adhered to his announced policy of a firm alliance with the West.⁴⁵ In more recent years, the Soviet Union has changed its approach and has been insisting that a reunified Germany should be accomplished by direct negotiations between East and West Germany.⁴⁶ This proposal is contrary to the stated western policy that East Germany is not a separate state and cannot speak for any of the German people in international affairs.⁴⁷

The Soviets also fear the reunification of a non-Communist Germany. They have thoroughly integrated East Germany into the Soviet Bloc, and it plays an important role in their economic

⁴⁵Dziewanowski, op. cit., p. 208.

⁴⁶Nikita Khrushchev, The Soviet Stand on Germany, p. 68.

⁴⁷US Dept of State Bulletin, Three Western Powers Reaffirm Desire for German Reunification, Vol. 51, 13 Jul. 1964, p. 45.

program as a member of The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). It provides the Soviet Bloc with machines, precision instruments and even complete plants for heavy and light industries.⁴⁸ Over 39 percent of the machinery and equipment imported by the Soviet Union from its East European partners comes from East Germany.⁴⁹ This is particularly significant in view of the fact that such machinery and equipment amount to over 45 percent of the total Soviet imports from these countries.⁵⁰ East Germany is also a valuable customer for Soviet exports, importing over 80 percent of its rolled steel, 75 percent of its coal, and most all of its oil and cotton from them.⁵¹

The Soviets have continued to indicate that peaceful coexistence between the East and West can be built only on the premise that the Communist empire is here to stay.⁵² Any acceptance of a rollback of Communist power would be looked upon by the free world and the Communist satellites as a sign of weakness. The Communist rulers in Russia can ill afford such an impression at this time in light of the nationalism that has been developing in some of the Eastern European countries.

⁴⁸ Nicholas Spulber, "A Pillar of Soviet Strength," Challenge, Vol. 10, Feb. 1962, p. 34.

⁴⁹ US Congress, Joint Committee Report, Joint Economic Committee, Current Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R., 1965, p. 154.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Spulber, op. cit., p. 36.

⁵² "The Problem of Germany," The British Survey, No. 180, Mar. 1964, p. 14.

CHAPTER 4

THE ALTERNATIVES

Considering the environment that has been established in West Germany and the country's role in world affairs, what are its alternatives? Adenauer's early goal of firmly integrating the country with the west has been realized. Its participation and contributions to the various alliances are an important part of the defense and economic prosperity of Western Europe. Thus, all of the free world is interested in what future course West Germany will follow.

The benefits from these alliances have been mutual. Western Europe is prospering under reasonably secure protection against Communist aggression. Although this threat still exists, it has been restrained by NATO. Behind this protection, West Germany has been able to establish its democratic government and develop its economic prosperity in a peaceful atmosphere. Its economy has developed not only through its internal industrial growth, but also as a result of trade with other countries.

There are several alternatives the country might consider. Some might increase the possibility of reunification, but weaken the structure of Western Europe. Others might allow for its continued growth as a world power while still helping to maintain a peaceful Europe. Before attempting any significant changes in its policies in response to nationalistic aspirations, the country must weigh

their impact on all concerned. This chapter contains an analysis of some possible alternatives believed to have the greatest effect on both.

CONFEDERATION

Probably the most reversionary alternative is to accept the Soviet proposal to establish a confederation on the two German states. This would reflect a complete change in the West German objection to recognizing East Germany as a sovereign state. Although one might argue that a confederation would at least provide a form of reunification, it is not a lasting type. Any such juncture under conditions acceptable to the Soviet Union would perpetuate the existence of two states whose economies, governments and ideologies are incompatible.

The Communists would retain control of their sector and attempt to extend their influence into West Germany. Conversely, the West German government would try to influence the East Germans toward democracy. The situation would deteriorate into another power struggle, and West Germany would gain nothing. The defense of Western Europe would also be seriously weakened. The NATO military power would be forced out of Germany into an even more shallow sector.

The only likely support for this alternative might be from some refugee groups who are thinking principally of their friends and relatives left in East Germany. However, these groups are not

politically strong enough to influence the country's foreign policy. The lack of any organized Communist influence in the country also denies any support from that source.

NEUTRALITY

An armed, neutral West Germany which retained its present armed forces, would permit the country to pursue its affairs without consideration for any of its present alliances. It might be able to gain some type of reunification with East Germany if it could convince the Soviet Union of its intention to remain neutral. However, the same problems would develop as in a confederation. West Germany is not strong enough to defend itself alone, and its neutral posture would be an invitation to Soviet aggression.

The Soviet Union cannot afford to create a similar neutral environment in East Germany. The Communist position is not strong enough to sustain itself without Soviet influence in the country. Any withdrawal of Soviet power from East Germany would be considered as a retreat by the other satellite nations and encourage their own nationalistic aspirations. The Soviet Union is now protected against the west by its own occupation forces in East Germany. It could not rely on the East German army to provide this same protection, and cannot risk giving up this tactical advantage to its western enemies.

A neutral West Germany would create a serious void in the European alliances that have been formed in past years. Both its geographic and economic positions in the center of Europe prevent it from selecting such an alternative. The present advantages of

the NATO protection and the economic community far outweigh the risks and material losses associated with neutrality. The German people have ambitions for themselves, their industries and their democratic way of life which would be stifled under this environment.

An unarmed neutrality only magnifies the problems described above. The country's role in world affairs today is too extensive for any type of neutral policy. Rather than increase the chances for a permanent peace in Europe, it would eventually generate another East-West confrontation.

A THIRD FORCE

West Germany must carefully consider the alternative of joining de Gaulle's Third Force which is designed to lessen the United States' influence in Europe. There appears to be no economic disadvantage to such a force, as the country would be able to maintain the same foreign trade program as it now has. However, there is little possibility that such an alliance would increase the chances of reunification. In fact, support for it would more likely lessen as a united Germany would become a challenge to France's intention to dominate the Third Force.

A Third Force would lack the military strength found in NATO. It will be a long time before France can assure the nuclear protection now provided Western Europe by the United States. Furthermore, there is no greater guarantee that France would use its nuclear weapons to defend West Germany than now exists in the NATO

system. It is also doubtful that the United States would retain its forces in Europe under this concept. No doubt, the Soviet Union would favor the Third Force idea as it obviously weakens the defensive structure of Western Europe.

Any alliance in which France and Germany vie for the dominant role would be strained. Although relations between the two countries are friendly, it is apparent that neither is willing to accept the other's leadership. Thus, the Third Force would be disrupted by this power struggle and be less effective than the NATO Alliance.

This alternative might be tempting to West Germany if it provided for an equal partnership with France, and included sharing of France's nuclear arms. Although these circumstances are not feasible now, perhaps they might become a reality once de Gaulle leaves office.

MULTILATERAL ALLIANCES

The last alternative offered for consideration is for West Germany to maintain close ties with the United States as well as Western Europe while gradually expanding its relations with selected countries in Eastern Europe.

Some critics may charge that this would be only an expedient with the intention of waiting to move in the most advantageous direction. Although it is impossible to be certain of one's intentions, past actions do not indicate any such desire, even in return for the opportunity to reunify as proposed by the Soviet Union. The country seems to be oriented toward democracy even at the cost of remaining divided for a longer period.

This alternative appears to be the policy of the current administration. It safeguards West Germany's democracy against Soviet political or military aggression which would develop in a confederation or a neutral status. It also retains the cooperation and friendship with the west which it must have in order to assure its present economic progress. This stable environment will also allow the country to concentrate some effort toward controlling the threatening inflation, and improving its agricultural, educational and communications systems.

As was discussed in Chapter 3, the opportunity for peaceful engagement with some of the satellite countries is increasing. Such a rapprochement might also help to promote closer multilateral ties between other countries. Here is an opportunity for West Germany to assert itself in world affairs and to accept some of the responsibilities associated with a world power.

There are some frustrations and disappointments that the country must accept if it selects this alternative. They include:

A continued wait for peaceful reunification.

No increased role in nuclear planning for some time.

Continued pressure by France for leadership in the European alliances.

These are the alternatives. The country's choice will become its destiny and the destiny of Western Europe.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Much has been accomplished by West Germany during these past ten years. The people have continued to better their own way of life, to improve their country's image, and to integrate themselves into the free world. Their work is not complete, nor is there any positive formula to assure that all their goals will be reached in the future. This analysis has led to the following conclusions:

1. West Germany's economic progress during the past ten years has enabled it to regain its position as one of the great industrial powers of the world, and to become an influential power in the Common Market.
2. The country's strong industrial capacity provides a means through foreign trade to compensate for its inadequate agricultural resources.
3. The present administration must take some firm action to control the inflationary trend which is starting to threaten the country's economy. This may take the form of increased government controls which is contrary to the country's past economic policies, and will not be well received by the people.
4. The West German people have accepted the democratic principles of government which have established a stable political environment as evidenced by the lack of extremism in the country.
5. Democracy's principle threat in West Germany is the lack of significant differences on major issues among the political

parties. This has caused an apathetic attitude within the electorate who are so interested in their individual well-being that they are not developing political interest within the younger generation. It may be difficult to find qualified, motivated replacements for those now in office.

6. Chancellor Erhard has successfully replaced Adenauer as head of the West German government. He is continuing to pursue active, pro-western policies, and resisting any Communist influences from the Soviet Union.

7. The new armed forces do not present any threat of a rebirth of German militarism. They have been accepted by the West German people as a means to help assure their continued political freedom.

8. West Germany's geographical position in Europe, and its large force contribution to NATO have made the country a critical power in the Alliance. However, it has been so thoroughly integrated into the NATO structure that it is prevented from taking any unilateral military actions which might weaken the organization or cause another major war.

9. In spite of West Germany's wish for a larger role in the nuclear defense of NATO, it will not be permitted to have its own nuclear force. The best that it can hope to receive is gradually increased nuclear planning responsibilities. This will continue to be a sensitive decision for the West German authorities to accept, but will not threaten NATO's stability.

10. Relations with France will continue to be tolerant but restrained as a result of de Gaulle's search for French grandeur. The German authorities will not respond to French political pressures, and most of the features of the Treaty of Cooperation will remain in effect.

11. The militant nationalism developing in many of the Eastern European countries provides an opportunity for West Germany to improve its image with them, and to weaken the Soviet Bloc. This could be manifested best by softening the Hallstein Doctrine thus permitting diplomatic relations with these countries. Once this has been accomplished, trade relations could be expanded and be mutually beneficial to the East and West.

12. Reunification in the foreseeable future is neither politically nor militarily practicable. The Soviet Union would permit it under only the most disadvantageous conditions for West Germany and Western Europe. It will occur only when the Soviet Union changes its position against reunification by self-determination.

13. Although the subject of reunification will remain a popular one in diplomatic circles, neither the German people nor any other country will take any positive, forceful action to accomplish it. It is not high on the agenda of world politics.

14. West Germany's future policies will be dictated by its desire to retain its political stability, its thriving economy and a protected, peaceful environment in Western Europe as well as the rest of the free world.

15. West Germany's development during this decade has been accepted by the other free world nations, but not without their continuing concern that someday it will again become the dominant power in Europe. To this extent, any effort toward regaining such a position will continue to be resisted by these nations for several years. It is not West Germany's destiny to become another super-power. Instead, it must content itself with being an active and valuable participant in the free world community.

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